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The paper first scrutinises the two indices of central bank independence (CBI) most
commonly used in the empirical literature. It defines and discovers an impressive
interpretation spread, a major criteria spread but a negligible weighting spread in
those indices. Second, it eiamines the robustness of the empirical 'common knowledge'
on the benefits of CBL It finds that, when rankings produced by various CBI indices are
regressed with, among others, average inflation, 87.5% of the regression coefficients are
not statistically significant Third, following recent theoretical developments, it suggests
an alternative approach to the measurement of a central bank's operational status.
1. Introduction
The idea that granting formal independence to a Central Bank (CB) is a way to
improve its country's (or region's) inflationary performance is currently enjoying
considerable popularity. The statutes of the European Central Bank, for instance,
formally prohibit the governments of EMU member countries from attempting to
influence the conduct of monetary policy (European Commission, 1991a and
1991b). In the UK, the newly-elected Chancellor (finance minister) has recently
won many praises for having introduced fresh legislation conferring operational
independence on the Bank of England. Central Bank Independence (CBI) has
become a fashionable notion.
The theoretical underpinnings for such claims are now quite well known: the
credibility of monetary policy is supposed to be enhanced when it is implemented
by an independent CB, as government pressures for a more expansionary stance
can be more easily resisted; the eradication of this so-called time-inconsistency
problem of monetary policy (and/or the weakening of the political business
cycle) should then lead workers to lower their inflationary expectations, and thus
to moderate their wage claims; as a consequence of lower wage settlements, average
inflation (as well as its variability) should be reduced.1
On the empirical front, the number and consistency of studies examining the
inverse CBI-inflation relationship also seem to build, at least at first sight, quite a
1
 For a dear and concise review of die complete theoretical argument for CBI, see ch. 3 of Cukierman
(1992), and the references thereia
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strong presumption in its favor Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) present an impress-
ive list of papers which, across different samples and different periods, all offer
evidence supporting that relationship.2
A number of authors, however, have revealed some significant weaknesses in
these theoretical and empirical conclusions. Posen (1994), whose results have been
indirectly confirmed by Debelle and Fischer (1994), deals a serious blow to the
theoretical justification for CBI. When testing for a number of predictions which
should be verified if higher CBI really leads to higher credibility, Posen finds that
none of these predictions is supported by the data, and therefore that even if
inflation is affected by CBI, there is no sign that it is so through the standard
credibility channel.
Similarly, other studies have questioned the various empirical findings on CBI.
Cargill (1995) argues that because of major flaws in the measurement of CBI in
certain countries, its negative link with inflation is weaker than originally thought.
Walsh (1993) and Forder (1996) stress that as long as measures of CBI are con-
sidered valid only when they correlate satisfactorily with inflation, they cannot
logically be used to test the hypothesis on which they are constructed.
This paper deals explicitly with these empirical concerns, and tries to gauge the
seriousness of the measurement problems affecting most (if not all) CBI indices. It
shows that it may be premature to take the conclusions of the numerous empirical
studies on CBI at face value, given that the measures of CBI on which they rely do
not appear to offer a fully satisfactory representation of a CB's statutes.
The majority of these studies base their investigations and conclusions on one of
two widely-respected CBI indices: those computed and presented by Grilli, Mas-
ciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), and by Cukierman (1992) in his ch. 19.3 In this
paper, I start by dissecting each of these indices and examining their consistency. I
then bring some other published indices into the picture, and use them to test the
robustness of the well-established common knowledge on the benefits of CBI.
Finally, I motivate and suggest alternative ways in which the CB's actual status
could be captured.
I show, first, that, although the two indices mentioned above share some
common features, they both suffer from a rather large 'subjectivity spread': any
empirical result based on either of them therefore appears questionable. My results
reinforce (and allow for an explicit quantification of) similar suspicions expressed
by other studies (see Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996; Cargill, 1995).
I then regress the country rankings produced by these and other CBI indices,
rather than the value of the indices, on inflation and growth, and find that,
although regression coefficients are usually of the expected sign, their statistical
It U worth noticing, however, that the evidence on the link between CBI and the variability of inflation
is much more mixed.
3
 Twenty out of the 26 empirical studies on CBI listed in Table 7 of Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) use at
least one of these measures.
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significance is generally poor (few of the f-statistics are above their null-hypothesis
rejection value at a 5% level of significance). This tends to confirm the impression
gained earlier, namely that the conclusions reached in the empirical literature about
the supposed effect of CBI on various other economic variables (notably inflation)
are on shakier foundations than is usually realised.
I finally argue that it is the whole of a CB's institutional structure (including
features such as its accountability), more than its mere legal independence, which
should be the centre of future measurement attempts. In particular, the conclusions
of recent studies which introduce agency theory into the theoretical analysis of the
interaction between CBs and political authorities (Fratianni et al. 1993; Persson &
Tabellini, 1993; Walsh, 1995) are well worth being applied to future empirical
investigations.
This study therefore differs from former research on CBI in at least four
respects:
(i) it offers an in-depth examination of the subjectivity and consistency of the
two most frequently used indices of CBI, and through this detailed analysis,
introduces four supplementary measures;
(ii) it places emphasis on the country-rankings produced by various CBI indices,
rather than on index-specific values;
(iii) it considers most indices of legal CBI, rather than just one or two, in its
investigation of the inverse CBI-inflation relationship;
(iv) it suggests a different empirical approach, motivated by recent theoretical
findings on the structural characteristics of CBs.
By questioning the reliability of existing CBI indices, it draws attention to one
of the fundamental weaknesses of the existing empirical literature on inflation
and CBI, and suggests that greater caution should be exerted when invoking its
results.
2. A review of existing indices
Attributing a unique value to a whole set of legal characteristics which influence the
way a CB operates is not an easy task; it involves a lot of subjectivity. Even the
authors of the two most thorough attempts at such a task acknowledge this fact.
Grilli et al. (1991) realise the arbitrariness of their aggregation method (p. 367), but
stress that they prefer to emphasise simplicity. Cukierman (1992) admits openly
(p.379) that his weighting scheme is simply designed to minimise data-availability
problems.
It would be somewhat narrow-minded, however, to reject all measures of CBI
constructed so far only on the grounds that they are subjective. What is more
interesting is to examine the practical consequences of such unavoidable subjectiv-
ity. This paper concentrates on that crucial but neglected issue. It examines in detail
the consistency of the two most widely-used CBI indices, compares the country
rankings they produce with those derived from other published indices, and tries to
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verify whether the much-acclaimed inverse relationship between CBI and average
inflation is 'subjectivity-proof'.4
In this section, the two CBI indices proposed by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukier-
man (1992) (henceforth, GMT and CUK, respectively) are dissected.5 A directly-
comparable version of each of these indices is constructed by analysing their indi-
vidual characteristics. With the help of these alternative indices, a method of
quantifying the subjectivity spread of the original indices is discussed, and a meas-
ure of the components of such a spread is offered. Finally, the country rankings
produced by the six indices considered, as well as their respective values, are
compared.
2.1 Reconsidering the data
It should be noted from the outset that, while other indices of legal CBI have
arguably received at least as much attention as CUK and GMT,6 the initial focus
here is only on these two indices mainly because they are built upon an extensive
range of detailed criteria (15 in the case of GMT, 16 for CUK). This allows for a
closer scrutiny of their consistency and comparability.7
Tables 1 and 2 show the values taken, in each of the 17 countries considered, by
each of the characteristics constituting (respectively) GMT and CUK, after the
following procedure has been applied to the original data.8 (i) refining the defini-
tion of some characteristics, in order for all of them to be expressible on a binary
scale (Yes/No) and in order for those which are common to both indices to be
directly comparable; (ii) normalising on a [0; 1] scale the value attributed by the
original studies to each variable,9 and (iii) where necessary, correcting values given
by GMT and completing values missing in CUK using the data set available in the
4
 i.e., Whether the conclusions of the statistical tests linking CBI and average inflation are robust with
respect to the subjectivity of the CBI indices used in those tests.
5
 Unless specified otherwise, CUK always refers to Cukierman's unweighted index LVAU relevant for the
1980-89 period (see Footnote 7 for a justification of that choice of period).
6
 Bade and Parkin (1982) and its subsequent extension in Alesina (1988) are two other oft-quoted
studies. There have since been other attempts at measuring legal or actual CBI, and some of them are
introduced and briefly described in Section 3.
7
 The quest for greater comparability also guided the choice of the countries to be included in the
sample, as well as the selection of the relevant period. On the first count, only the countries present
in both GMTs and CUK's sample are considered in this section, which yields a total of 17 countries. On
the second count, the values retained for CUK's characteristics are the ones attributed to them by
Cukierman (1992) in the 1980s, given that GMT is claimed by its authors to cover the 'flexible
exchange-rate period' (hence presumably post-1972), and that in die countries studied here, there is
no major difference anyway between the values shown in Cukierman (1992) for the 1970-79 or the
1980-39 period.
* The original data itself is given, for the sake of completeness, in Tables la and 2a.
' In CUK's case, where most characteristics take several values between 0 and 1, the threshold for the
choice between a 0 or a 1 value—le. indirectly the refined definition of the variable—was chosen, when
possible, to yield maximum similarity with GMT for that characteristic
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Table 1 Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) index: refined and normalised
criteria
CBGA
CBGT
MPFA
PSSO
LDCR
CLGI
CLGM
CLGL
PGDP
GMT9
CBBA
CBBT
CBBG
CLGA
DRSA
CBSR
GMTN
AU
0
1
0
I
0
1
0
1
1
0S6
0
0
0
1
1
0
0.47
B
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0 7?
0
1
0
0
1
1
0.33
CH
0
1
1
0R9
0
0
1
0
1
1
0.73
CN
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
044
0
0
0
1
1
1
0.47
D
0
()
1
0 78
0
1
1
1
1
0
0.73
DK
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0 33
1
0
0
0
1
1
0.40
FR
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0 7?
0
1
0
0
1
1
0.33
GR
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
OK
1
0
0
0
1
0
0.33
IR
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0 67
0
0
0
0
1
0
0.47
IT
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0 7?
1
0
1
0
0
0
0.27
J
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
OK
0
0
0
1
1
0
0.33
NL
0
I
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0 67
0
1
1
0
1
0
0.60
NZ
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0 7?
0
0
0
0
1
0
0.20
6
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0 67
1
0
0
0
1
1
0.60
SP
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
OK
0
1
1
0
0
0
0.33
UK
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0 33
0
0
1
1
1
0
0.40
US
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0 78
0
1
1
1
1
0
0.73
Notes: Original data refined, when possible and suitable, on the basis of Appendix C in GMT (1991),
and normalised to be expressed on binary scale.
GMT9 is a simple average over the normalised values of the nine refined criteria common to both
GMT and CUK indices, as measured by Grilli et al. (1991).
GMTN is a simple average over the normalised values of the nine refined and six remaining criteria
used in GMT (1991).
CBGA: CB Governor Appointment (1 if not only appointed by Government, 0 otherwise).
CBGT: CB Governor, Terms of Office (1 if explicitly appointed for more than 5 years, 0 otherwise).
MPFA: Monetary Policy Formulation Authority (1 if no Government approval required, 0 otherwise).
PSSO: Price Stability as Statutory Objective (1 if at least among statutory objectives, 0 otherwise).
LDCR: Legal Directives for Conflict Resolution (1 if strengthen CB position, 0 otherwise).
CLGI: CB Lending to Government, Interest-rate (1 if at market interest rate or if lending not
available, 0 otherwise).
CLGM: CB Lending to Government, Maturity (1 if explicitly limited to 1 year or less or if lending not
available, 0 otherwise).
CLGL: CB lending to Government, Limit (1 if amount explicitly limited or if lending not available,
0 otherwise).
PGDP: Purchase of Government Debt, Primary market (1 if CB not allowed to participate, 0
otherwise).
CBBA: CB Board Appointment (1 if majority of Board members not appointed by Government, 0
otherwise).
CBBT: CB Board, Terms of office (1 if all Board appointed for more than 5 years, 0 otherwise).
CBBG: CB Board, Government representative (1 if presence not compulsory, 0 otherwise).
CLGA; CB Lending to Government, Availability (1 if not automatic, 0 otherwise).
DRSA: Discount Rate Setting Authority (1 if only CB can set discount rate, 0 otherwise).
CBSR: CB Supervisory Role (1 if CB not involved in banking supervision, 0 otherwise).
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Table la Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) index: original criteria
CBGA'
CBGT'
MPFA
PSSO
LDCR
CLGI'
CLGM'
CLGL'
PGDP'
CBBA'
CBBT
CBBG
CLGA
DRSA'
CBSR
GMT
AU
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
9
B
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
2
7
CH
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
2
12
CN
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
11
D
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
13
DK
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
8
FR
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
2
7
GR
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
4
IR
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
7
IT
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
5
J
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
6
NL
0
()
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
10
NZ
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
3
6
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
9
SP
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
5
UK
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
6
US
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
12
Note GMT is a simple sum over the original values of the 15 criteria used in GMT (1991).
CBGA': CB Governor Appointment (1 if not appointed by Government, 0 otherwise).
CBGT': CB Governor, Terms of Office (1 if appointed for more than 5 years, 0 otherwise).
MPFA: Monetary Policy Formulation Authority (1 if no Government approval required, 0 otherwise).
PSSO: Price Stability as Statutory Objective (1 if at least among statutory objectives, 0 otherwise).
LDCR: Legal Directives for Conflict Resolution (1 if strengthen CB position, 0 otherwise).
CLGl': CB Lending to Government, Interest rate (1 if at market interest rate, 0 otherwise).
CLGM':CB Lending to Government, Maturity (1 if temporary, 0 otherwise).
CLGL': CB Lending to Government, Limit (1 if amount limited, 0 otherwise).
PGDP : Purchase of Government Debt, Primary market (1 if CB does not participate, 0 otherwise).
CBBA : CB Board Appointment (1 if Board members not appointed by Government, 0 otherwise).
CBBT: CB Board, Terms of office (1 if Board appointed for more than 5 years, 0 otherwise).
CBBG: CB Board, Government representative (1 if presence not compulsory, 0 otherwise).
CLGA: CB Lending to government, Availability (1 if not automatic, 0 otherwise).
DRSA': Discount Rate Setting Authority (1 if discount rate set by CB, 0 otherwise).
CBSR : CB Supervisory Role (2 if CB not involved in banking supervision, 1 if CB not alone to be
involved in banking supervision, 0 otherwise).
Appendices of the original studies. The first nine characteristics appearing in each
table are common to both indices, while all others are specific to the index under
which they are listed. For each country, GMT9 and CUK9 denote the simple
average over the values attributed to the first nine criteria by each study, while
GMTN and CUKN describe the simple average over the values attributed to all
criteria shown in each table.
To realise how useful these four supplementary measures can be, it is worth
recalling in which precise respect synthetic indices of legal CBI can be considered as
subjective. As Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) have correctly pointed out (p.50),
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Table 2 Cukierman (1992) index, 1981-89: completed and normalised criteria
CBGA
CBGT
MPFA
PSSO
LDCR
CLGI
CLGM
CLGL
PGDP
CUK9
CBGD
CBGO
BPFA
PGDL
CLGC
GLGB
CLGT
CUKN
AU
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0.56
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.44
B
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
n ii
0
0
0
0
0
0
NA
0.07
CH
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
l
i
0
0
1
1
0
0.56
CN
I
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
044
0
0
0.56
D
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0 78
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0.69
DK
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0 56
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0.44
FR
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0 7?
1
0
0
0
0
1
NA
0.27
GR
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
I
0
0
I
0
0
I
0.50
IR
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0 56
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.44
IT
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0 77
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.25
J
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
n ii
l
0
0
0
0
0
NA
0.13
NL
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0 11
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0.38
NZ
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0 11
1
1
0
0
0
1
NA
0.27
6
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0 67
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0.56
SP
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0 7?
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.19
UK
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
n n
I
I
0
0
0
1
NA
0.27
US
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
044
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0.44
Notes: Original criteria normalised to be expressed on binary scale, and when not available (13
instances), completed if possible using Appendix C Ln Grilli et at (1991).
CUK9 is a simple average over the normalised values of the nine refined criteria common to both
GMT and CUK, as measured by Cukierman (1992).
CUKN is a simple average over the normalised values of the nine refined and seven remaining criteria
used in CUK (1992).
CBGD: CB Governor Dismissal (1 if cannot be decided by Government for policy reasons, 0 otherwise).
CBGO: CB Governor, Other governmental post tenure (1 if explicitly not allowed by law, 0 otherwise).
BPFA: Budgetary Policy Formulation Authority (1 if CB given active role, 0 otherwise).
PGDL: Purchase of Government Debt, limit (1 if explicitly limited, 0 otherwise).
CLGC: CB Lending to Government, Conditions (1 if no Government influence on conditions, 0
otherwise).
CLGB CB Lending to Government, Borrowers (1 if only political entities can borrow or if lending not
available, 0 otherwise or if unclear).
CLGT: CB Lending to Government, Type of limit (1 if limit not expressed in terms of Government
revenues or expenditures, 0 otherwise, NA if CLGL = 0).
See Table 1 for other abbreviations.
there are three types of choice involved when constructing any such index, in which
some degree of personal judgement unavoidably intervenes: (i) which criteria
should be included in the index? (ii) how should the legislation be interpreted
with respect to each retained criterion (which leads to their individual valuation)?
and (iii) what weight should be attributed to each criterion in the composite index?
Along the lines of this classification, it is therefore possible to describe the
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Table 2a Cukierman (1992) index, 1981-89: original criteria
AU B CH CN D DK FR GR IR IT J N l NZ 0 SP I I US
CBGA'
CBGT"
MPFA"
PSSO"
LDCR"
CLGI"
CLGM"
CLGL"
PGDP
CBGD"
CBGO"
BPFA
PGDL"
CLGC"
CLGB'
CLGT"
0.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
0.75 0.50 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.25
NA 033 0.67 NA 0.67 0.33 NA NA 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 NA
1.00 0.60 0.00 0.80 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.40 0.60 0.60 0.20 0.40
1.00 1.00 0.60 0.60 NA NA 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.20
NA 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.25
1.00 1.00 NA 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
0.67 1.00 0.00 0.67 NA 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 033 1.00 0.67 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.17 0.83 0.83 0.00 0.83 0.00
0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.33
0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 033
0.00 0.33 NA NA 1.00 1.00 033 0.33 1.00 1.00
NA 1.00 NA 0.00 NA 1.00 NA 033 0.00 1.00 NA
0.33 0.00 
0.40 0.00 0.00 0.20
0.20 0.20 1.00 0.20
1.00 030 025 0.75 0.25 0.25
0.67 1.00 1.00 0.67
1.00 0.33
0.00
0.83
1.00 1.00
0.33 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00
0.83 0.00 NA
1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 NA 0.33 0.67 0.33
0.33 033 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 033
0.00 033 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00
NA NA NA 0.33 1.00 NA
CUK 0.31 0.19 0.68 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.28 0.51 039 0.22 0.16 0.42 0.27 0.58 0.21 0.31 0.51
Note MCUK** tt a weighted average over the origin*! viluei of the 16 criteria used in Cukierman (1992).
CBGA*- CB Governor Appointment
1 00 if appointed by CB Board,
0 75 if appointed by legislative and executive branches
of Government and by CB board,
030 if appointed by legislative branch,
025 if appointed by executive branch,
0.00 if appointed by 1 or 2 members of executtve branch.
CBGT*- CB Governor, Terras of office
1.00 if longer than or equal to 8 years,
0 75 if between 6 years and less than 8 years,
0.50 if equal to 5 year*,
0.25 if equal to 4 years,
0.00 if (mailer than 4 years.
MPFA*- Monetary Policy Formulation Authority
1.00 if granted to CB alone,
0.67 if granted to both CB and Government,
0J3 if CB's capacity only advisory,
0.00 if granted to Government alone.
PSSO*. Price Stability as Statuory Objective
1.00 if only objective and CB has final authority,
0.M if only objective,
0 60 if other non-conflicting objectives,
0.40 if other conflicting objectives,
0.20 if no objective* In CB charter,
0.00 if only other objectives in CB charter
LDCR*: Legal Directive* for Conflict Resolution
1.00 if attributed to CB for CB's objective*,
OJJO if attributed to Government only for non-objectives,
0.60 if attributed to CB board, legUsUtnre and executive
branches of Government,
0.40 if unconditionalry attributed to legislative branch,
0 JO if conditionally attributed to executive branch,
0,00 if unconditionally attributed to executive branch.
CLGI*: CB Lending to Government, Interest-rate
1.00 if must be at market level,
0.75 if cannot be lower than a certain floor.
030 if cannot be higher than a certain ceiling,
0J5 if not restricted.
OJOO if no interest payment required.
CLGM*:CB Lending to Government, Maturity
1.00 tf limited to 6 months,
0.67 if limited to 12 months,
0.33 if limited to more than 12 months,
0.00 if unlimited.
CLGL*: CB Lending to Government, Limit
1.00 if lending prohibited,
0.67 if lending subjected to strict limits,
0J3 if lending subjected to accommodative limits,
0.00 if lending unlimited.
PGDP: Purchase of Government Debt, Primary market
1.00 if CB not allowed to participate
0.00 if CB allowed to participate.
CBGD*:CB Governor Dismissal
1.00 if not provided for,
0JJ3 if possible only for nonpoucy reasons,
0 67 if unconditionally possible by CB Board,
030 if conditionally possible by legislative branch,
0 J3 if unconditionally possible by legistatrfe branch,
0.17 if conditionally posrible by executiTe branch,
0.00 if unconditionally possible by executive branch.
CBGO*: CB Governor, other governmental post tenure
1 00 if prohibited,
030 if subjected to approral by executive branch,
OJOO if not prohibited.
BPFA; Budgetary Policy Formulation Authority
1.00 if active role for CB,
OJOO if no active role for CB,
PGDL*. Purchase of Government Debt, limit
1.00 if purchase prohibited,
0.67 if purchase subjected to strict limits,
0.33 if purchase subjected to accommodative broils,
0 00 if purchase unlimited.
CLGC*:C8 Lending to Government, Conditions
1 DO if controlled by CB,
0.67 if control attributed by bw to CB,
0.33 if control left by law negotiations between
CB and Government,
0.00 if controlled by executive branch.
CLGB"; CB Lending to Government, Borrowers
1.00 if only central Government,
0.67 if central and cute Governments,
0.33 if all of the above plus public firms,
OJOO if all of the above plus private seaor.
CLGT*: CB Lending to Government, Type of limit
1.00 if absolute cub amount,
0.67 if percentage of CB capital,
0 J3 if percentage of Government revenues,
0JX) tf percentage of Government expenditure*.
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subjectivity spread from which every index of legal CBI suffers as consisting of three
main parts:
(i) a criteria spread, i.e. the extent to which the researchers' personal preferences
affect the selection of the criteria to be included in the index;
(ii) an interpretation spread, i.e. the extent to which the researchers' reading of
the legislation pertaining to these criteria is different; and
(iii) a weighting spread, i.e. the extent to which the final value of the index is
affected by the choice of relative weights to be attributed to each individual
criterion.
With the help of the supplementary indices computed above, each of these spreads
can now be individually considered, and a tentative quantification of their value in
the case of CUK and GMT can be offered.
2.2 Interpretation spread
Having identified nine criteria included in both CUK and GMT, and having con-
verted to a common scale the values attributed by each study to those criteria (see
Tables 1 and 2), it is now fairly straightforward to measure how strongly the
authors of the two indices disagree in the criteria-valuation stage, i.e. their (aver-
age) interpretation spread.
Table 3 takes a closer look at these nine common criteria. It directly compares
the value attributed by CUK and GMT to each criterion in each country: whenever
both indices agree on that value, a 'Yes' entry is shown in the relevant position of
the table; when they do not, 'No' is entered. For each country, the percentage of
'No' entries is then computed and shown in the last row of the table: it indicates the
(average) Interpretation Spread by Country from which CUK and GMT seem to
suffer. Similarly, for each criterion, the percentage of 'No' entries appears in the last
column of the table, and is described as the (average) Interpretation Spread by
Criterion exhibited by the indices in question. Finally, a measure of their (average)
Overall Interpretation Spread appears in the bottom-right cell of the table.l0
The results of this simple procedure reveal a significant degree of inconsistency
between the two indices' valuation of their common criteria. Only in one country
(out of 17) and in the case of one criterion (out of 9) have CUK and GMT
translated the legislation in exactly the same way: their interpretation of the laws
governing the Italian CB, and of the regulations concerning the CB Governors'
terms of office in the countries sampled, exhibit no divergence. On the other hand,
their average interpretation spread when examining Danish, French, Greek, and
10
 Given the binary nature of each characteristic, it doesn't really matter which of the two indices is
wrong and which is right when they disagree on the value *9 to be taken by a characteristic i in a country
p the Interpretation Spread (either by country or by criterion) still indicates the percentage of instances
in which the relevant legislation was misinterpreted, either by one or by the other index. In that sense,
this procedure neither allows nor attempts to decide which of the two indices is 'more wrong' in its
reading of the law: it just indicates how wrong, on average, the two of them are.
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Table 3 Criteria common to CUK and GMT: disagreement in the interpretation of
CB legislation
AU B CH CN D DK FR GR IR IT J NL NZ 6 SP UK US IS (Cr)
CBGA Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12%
CBGT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0%
MPFA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 24%
PSSO Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 29%
LDCR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 24%
CLGI Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 29%
CLGM No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 41%
CLGL Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 35%
PGDP No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No 59%
IS(Co) 22% 33% 33% 22% 22% 44% 44% 44% 11% 0% 44% 33% 33% 22% 11% 22% 33% 28%
Notes: 'Yes' indicates agreement between CUKN and GMTN on the value of the relevant criterion in
the relevant country; 'No' indicates disagreement.
IS (Cr) is the Interpretation Spread by Criterion; it indicates the proportion of countries in which the
two studies do not agree on the value to be given to the relevant criterion.
IS (Co) is the Interpretation Spread by Country, it indicates the proportion of criteria over the value
of which the two studies do not agree in the relevant country.
See Table 1 for abbreviations.
Japenese legislation is close to 50%, and they disagree in nearly 60% of countries
when deciding whether the CB is legally allowed to purchase government debt in
the primary market or not Overall, it appears that in the 17 countries included in
both CUK's and GMT's samples, virtually a third of the values attributed to their
nine common criteria are subject to non-negligible interpretation problems."
While the scale of the problem had not previously been measured in such a
systematic way, its existence had already been anticipated by a number of authors:
the analysis in this section has allowed for a formal confirmation and a more
precise quantification of those intuitive perceptions. Eijffinger and de Haan
(1996) draw on their detailed knowledge of the Dutch CB's legislation to show
(Section 3.2) that CUK attributes an incorrect value to five of the 16 characteristics
by which he measures its legal independence (again, almost a third of the total).
Cargill (1995), emphasising that 'the basic problem with indices is they ultimately
rely on a researcher's interpretation of central bank laws' (p. 163), admits having 'a
difficulty to rationalise the ranking of the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve
presented in the Bade and Parkin (1982) study' (p.161).12 Eijffinger and Schaling
11
 This problem may even be worse than appears from these figures; they reh/ on the assumption that at
least one of the two indices has interpreted the legislation correctly, but this is not necessarily the case.
12
 This does not prevent Cargill, howeveT, from falling into the 'subjectivity trap' himself: his reasons for
disagreeing with Bade and Parkin's (1982) attribution of the same rank to the BoJ and the Fed is that 'the
Bank of Japan is generally regarded as one of the more formally dependent centra] banks' (p. 164).
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(1993) criticise Alesina's (1988) subjective re-interpretation of the Italian CB's
statutes, stressing that it renders his index internally inconsistent (p.59).13
2.3 Criteria spread
Here again, it is impossible to discuss the appropriateness of the characteristics
constituting Individual indices without being exposed to some degree of sub-
jectivity as well: on which objective grounds would a criterion be considered as
acceptable for inclusion, and what would objectively justify die exclusion of
another? It could always be argued that, intuitively, a few criteria should un-
questionably qualify, while some others needn't even be considered; but where
should the line be drawn between diese two categories? Clearly, these questions
cannot be answered satisfactorily: blaming authors for having incorporated one
characteristic rather than another is displaying as much subjectivity as (if not more
than) they do.
Instead, what the standardisation of the data attempted in Section 2.1 allows for
is a relative approach to the problem. It is not used to criticise one or the other
index for taking some characteristics into account, while neglecting others;14 it
merely helps us to measure how strongly the authors of the indices disagree as
to the necessity of including certain criteria. In that sense, the measure presented in
this subsection can only capture the Criteria Disagreement Factor separating the
two studied indices, rather than a genuine (but much more subjectivity-prone)
Criteria Bias.
The procedure is simple enough: it merely involves computing the ratio, in both
indices, of the number of index-specific criteria to their total number, and com-
paring these two ratios. Even on this very straightforward count, CUK and GMT
reveal a significant degree of disagreement: as much as 40% of the characteristics
included in GMT are not considered as relevant by CUK, while GMT disregards
45% of die criteria seen by CUK as essential to measure CBI.
Obviously, it would have been all the more interesting to be able to compare
these proportions with those exhibited by other studies, but such a comparison is
made particularly tricky by die fact that no other syndietic index of CBI is built
upon such an extensive range of detailed criteria. Other published measures rely
eidier on a series of loosely-defined policy types (Bade and Parkin, 1982; Eijffinger
and Schaling, 1993; Eijffinger and van Keulen, 1995), or on indicators of political
influence upon the CB (Cukierman and Webb, 1994), or even on answers to
questionnaires sent out to CB officials (Cukierman, 1992, QVAU and QVAW).
"Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) also attempt to measure what they call an 'interpretation effect', but
choose to compare the Bade and Parkin (1982) index (rather than CUK) with GMT and rely on only two
of these indices' common criteria to quantify such an effect.
14
 In particular, nowhere in the analysis do I imply that the nine characteristics which CUK and GMT
have in common are some sort of core features of CBI: that would clearly constitute an implicit criticism
of other indices which might have chosen not to include some of these criteria.
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Alternatively, a similar comparison could be made between the relative weight
attributed by CUK and GMT to their respective index-specific criteria:15 it would
indicate what importance the authors attribute in their index to the criteria on
which they disagree. For obvious reasons, however, such a comparison would be
directly affected by the third type of spread identified earlier it would incorporate
disagreement not only on the type of criteria to include, but also on the relative
importance of each of those criteria.
As it turns out, the significance of the weighting spread16 inherent in CUK and
GMT is difficult to estimate. It can be approximated by computing the partial
correlations between the normalised versions of the indices and their original
counterparts.17 However, the results suggest that the choice of a specific weighting
scheme is probably unlikely to add much to an index's (already significant) degree
of subjectivity.18 In any case, the weighting differential between GMT and GMTN is
minimal, since it is only caused by a single criterion to which a value of up to two is
attributed in GMT, while it is restricted to a maximum of 1 in GMTN.
In summary, significant signs of the presence of an impressive interpretation
spread, of a major criteria spread but of a neglible weighting spread in existing CBI
indices have been discovered through the above analysis. It is worth stressing,
however, that all the above estimations find themselves limited by two factors:
the rather small sample of countries examined in both indices, and the very fact
that only two existing indices offer a wide enough scope for comparison. These
limitations should be borne in mind when (and if) future references to the above
findings are made.
2.4 Introducing country rankings
Table 4 summarises the values, for each of the 17 countries in the sample, of the 6
indices considered so far. It also introduces the country rankings obtained using
each of these indices. Partial correlations between some of their respective country
15Benassy and Pisani-Ferry (1994), for instance, calculate in their Appendix 1 the relative weight
attributed by GMT and CUK to all their respective characteristics. Before doing so, however, they
group some of CUK's criteria into broader categories and compute those criteria's joint weight,
which makes their results difficult to interpret.
16
 In a sense, the criteria spread U an extension of the weighting spread; when the authors of an index
decide not to include a certain characteristic, they implicitly attribute a weight of 0 to it However, the
information set upon which those decisions are made is not exactly the same: had additional criteria
been included, the relative weights of all or some others might have been different.
17
 Given that GMTN and CUKN include the same characteristics as GMT and CUK (respectively), but
constitute simple rather than weighted averages of these characteristics' values, this procedure could
reveal the significance of the distortion introduced by the particular weighting method chosen by each
index's authors.
18
 Both pairs of indices exhibit an identical partial correlation of 0.92, and the partial correlation between
CUKN and GMTN (at 0.71) is virtually identical to the one between CUK and GMT (0.70), which
confirms that even unifying the weighting schemes adopted by the two indices does not make them
radically more consistent with each other.
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Table 4 GMT, CUK, and derived CBI indices
AU
B
CH
CN
D
DK
F
GR
IR
IT
J
NL
NZ
0
SP
UK
US
GMT
0.60
0.47
0.80
0.73
0.87
0.53
0.47
0.27
0.47
0.33
0.40
0.67
0.20
0.60
0.33
0.40
0.80
Values
GMTN GMT9
0.47
0.33
0.73
0.47
0.73
0.40
0.33
0.33
0.47
0.27
0.33
0.60
0.20
0.60
0.33
0.40
0.73
0.56
0.22
0.89
0.44
0.78
0.33
0.22
0.33
0.67
0.22
0.33
0.67
0.22
0.67
0.33
0.33
0.78
CUK
0.31
0.19
0.68
0.46
0.66
0.47
0.28
0.51
0.39
0.22
0.16
0.42
0.27
0.58
0.21
0.31
0.51
CUKN
0.44
0.07
0.56
0.56
0.69
0.44
0.27
0.50
0.44
0.25
0.13
0.38
0.27
0.56
0.19
0.27
0.44
CUK9
0.56
0.11
0.56
0.44
0.78
0.56
0.22
0.56
0.56
0.22
0.11
0.33
0.11
0.67
0.22
0.11
0.44
Partial correlations between values
GMT GMTN GMT9 CUK CUKN CUK9
GMT
6
9
2
4
1
8
9
16
9
14
12
5
17
6
14
12
2
Rankings (17-country
GMTN GMT9
6
11
1
6
1
9
11
11
6
16
11
4
17
4
11
9
1
7
14
1
8
2
9
14
9
4
14
9
4
14
4
9
9
2
Partial correlations
GMT GMTN GMT9
CUK
9
16
1
6
2
5
12
4
8
14
17
7
13
3
15
9
9
sample)
CUKN
6
17
2
2
1
6
11
5
6
14
16
10
11
2
15
11
6
CUK9
3
14
3
8
1
3
11
3
3
11
14
10
14
2
11
14
8
between rankings
CUK CUKN CUK9
GMT 1.00 0.92 0.82 0.70 1.00 0.91 0.74 0.58
GMTN 1.00 0.95 0.71 1.00 0.93 0.70
GMT9 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.66
CUK 1.00 0.92 0.85 1.00 0.93 0.83
CUKN 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.85
CUK9 1.00 1.00
Note: Value of GMT (including one used to compute country ranking) normalised to be expressed in
the [0, 1] interval.
rankings, as well as between some of their respective values (among which are those
briefly discussed above), are displayed in the lower part of the table.
Reassuringly for the argument, the general picture offered by the comparison of
values is consistent with the findings of the preceding subsections. The degree of
correlation between GMT9 and CUK9, for instance, is not much higher than the
one between GMT and CUK (0.71 and 0.70, respectively). This further confirms the
seriousness of the measurement problem (interpretation spread) from which the
two original indices suffer if the nine criteria which they both include had been
measured properly, GMT9 and CUK9 should have been identical (i.e. the correla-
tion between them should have been very close to 1.00). Similarly, the fact that the
correlation is stronger between GMTN and GMT9 than between GMT and GMT9
(0.95 vs 0.82), and that the same is observed on the CUK side (0.92 vs 0.85), may be
seen as a confirmation of the presence of some weighting spread.
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There are reasons to believe, however, that comparing the country rankings
produced by the six indices, rather than their actual values, should yield even
more valuable results. Most importantly, this procedure avoids at least some of
the subjectivity involved in the measurement of CBI. It is not affected by the fact
that, say, the most dependent CB according to one index carries a precise value of
0.01, while in another, in which it is also seen as the most dependent, it is attributed
a different value of 0.1; all it takes into account is that the same CB is actually
considered as the least independent by both of them. The partial correlations be-
tween rankings are therefore not influenced by extreme values, and should prove a
more reliable indicator of how consistent the indices really are with each other.
The impression left by these calculations is even more striking than when values
were considered. For a start, the correlation between CUK's and GMT's classifica-
tion of countries is a mere 0.58, which tends to reinforce the impression of general
inconsistency gathered earlier, furthermore, the ranking implied by GMT9 is again
poorly linked to its CUK9 counterpart (0.66), strengthening former observations
about the indices' interpretation spread; finally, the country orderings offered by
GMTN and CUKN are now markedly more consistent than those offered by GMT
and CUK (0.70 vs 0.58), suggesting that the weighting spread may have deeper
consequences than was previously thought.20
There is an important conclusion to be drawn from the significant subjectivity
spread and lack of consistency of the two most widely-used CBI indices as revealed
in this section. Given that quite a few empirical studies on the effects of CBI on
inflation (as well as on other variables) rely on one or the other of these measures,
the findings of those studies may not be particularly reliable. This empirical doubt
echoes the theoretical scepticism about the same relationship expressed by Posen
(1994).
Obviously, further investigations are required to confirm (or dispel) these
doubts. In particular, it would be interesting to test for the sensitivity of the
CBI-inflation relationship (among others) to changes in measures of CBI, while
possibly avoiding some of the subjectivity inherent in these measures.21 This is
precisely the aim of the next section.
" Some informat ion is inevitably lost when switching from values to ranks. The latter, for instance, do
not reflect the fact that , say, the institutional difference between the mos t and second-most independent
CB may be m u c h s l immer than between the least and next-to-least independent . But since the only
objective of this exercise is to measure the consistency of the two retained indices, such information is
irrelevant for o u r purposes , in particular in a sample as relatively homogeneous as 17 O E C D countries.
20
 The only correlat ion which is stronger when rankings rather than values are considered is the one
between CUK and CUKN, bu t even then the improvement is of the order of only one percentage point
(0.93 against 0.92).
21
 O n e of the major dangers of this type of excercise is the tendency to describe one of the indices as ' the
most appropr ia te ' s imply because it exhibits the closest relationship with average inflation; as Walsh
(1993) and Forder ( 1 9 % ) have already pointed out , many au thors of existing CBI indices have tended to
fall in to this inflation-biased judgement .
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3. A reconsideration of the empirical evidence on CBI
It is well known that the majority of empirical studies which have tried to examine
the effect of statutory independence on various macroeconomic variables have
produced fairly consistent results.22 Using various samples, periods and CBI indices
(with GMT and CUK a recurrent choice), 17 out of the 19 studies listed in Table 8
of Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) have concluded that there is a statistically-
significant inverse relationship between CBI and average inflation; seven out of
the 12 studies in that list which also tested for a link between CBI and inflation
variability have reached conclusive results; and eight out of the ten studies which,
according to Table 11 of Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), examined the effect of CBI
on the average and the variability of real-output growth, have not found any
statistically significant link.
The previous section, however, underlined the weaknesses of the two most
widely-used indices of legal CBI, and argued that because of their rather large
subjectivity spread, they probably do not constitute a totally reliable measure of
a CB's statutes. As a consequence, even the most compelling evidence on the effects
of CBI may be weaker than previously thought.
Admittedly, some authors have relied on more than one measure of indepen-
dence in their empirical research, or on a combination of several of them, and have
generally obtained consistent results. But any combination of unreliable measures,
no matter how elaborate, is still an unreliable measure itself: the fact that a link
between CBI and various macroeconomic variables is insensitive to the type of
index used says nothing about the sensitivity of that link to the quality of the
indices.
This section presents an empirical test of the relationship between CBI and
inflation (as well as growth) which avoids at least some of the subjectivity discussed
earlier. Rather than using the values of a number of indices as explanatory variables,
it uses the country rankings produced by these indices. As argued in Section 2.4,
rankings are less affected by the precise characteristics of each index: they are likely
to minimise the adverse effect of weighting or criteria problems. The regressions
should thus reveal whether the results of former empirical investigations were
influenced by the subjectivity of the CBI indices they relied on.
At this stage, it becomes possible and appropriate to include in the analysis as
many other proxies of CBI as possible: all that matters is how these indices rank the
countries they consider, regardless of which characteristics they take into account
to achieve that ranking.23 Accordingly, four supplementary measures are intro-
duced: the Alesina (1988) extension of the Bade and Parkin (1982) CBI index
22
 For a comprehensive list o f these studies, see Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) , table 7.
23
 For the sake of comparability, however, every attempt is made to keep the joint sample o f countries as
large as possible, which means that s o m e measures are left out because the number o f countries for
which they are calculated is t o o small
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(AL); the Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) index of policy independence, extended by
Eijffinger and van Keulen (1995) (ES); the turnover rate of CB governors, as
calculated by Cukierman (1992) (TOR); and the Cukierman and Webb (1994)
index of the CB's political vulnerability (CW). There are only 12 countries over
which these as well as the other six indices discussed in Section 2 are all computed,
so that the rankings are distributed according to this 12-country sample (and not
according to each measure's original sample).
Figure 1 presents a preliminary view of the consistency of the ten resulting
rankings. Switzerland and Germany are the countries over which the indices
agree most strongly, with only TOR and CW placing neither the Schweizerische
Nationalbank nor the Bundesbank in their top two positions. In most other cases,
however, the disagreement as to the relative position of each CB appears more
widespread. The charts reveal a rather large dispersion of opinion, with the ranks of
the Bank of Japan and of the Bank of England being the most controversial
Table 5 offers a full list of these classifications, as well as the respective coeffi-
cients of partial correlation between them. It appears from the bottom half of this
table that the rankings produced by the four indices introduced in this section are
generally rather poorly related to each other, ES and CW in particular exhibit a low
degree of correlation with all other measures. This should not, however, be inter-
preted as a sign that one index is better or worse than any other all it indicates is
that the various measures do not capture identical aspects of a CB's status.
Each of these ten series is then used as the explanatory variable, in the 12-country
sample, for each of four dependent variables: the average annual rate of growth of
the GDP deflator over the years 1980-89, the average annual rate of real GDP
growth over the same period, and the variances of these two rates.25 A summary
of the results of these 40 regressions is given in Table 6.
With one exception (CW), the sign of the link between the discussed rankings
and average inflation (proxied by the average growth of the GDP deflator) is
consistent with existing evidence: the higher the rank of a country's CB, i.e. the
less independent the CB is considered, the higher the average rate of inflation in
that country during the 1980s. However, the statistical significance of the relevant
coefficients is erratic: out of ten regressions, only two (those in which the rankings
of GMT and GMTN are the explanatory variables) produce a f-statistic which is
above its null-hypothesis rejection value at a 5% level of significance, and only one
of these t-statistics (associated with the AL classification) is above that value at a
"The rankings derived from GMT, GMTN, GMT9, CUK, CUKN, and CUK9 do not display the same
correlation among them as in Section 2: this is obviously due to the fact that the size of the sample has
been reduced from 17 to 12 countries.
25
 While TOR and CW were calculated by their authors over four decades (1950-89) to give them greater
significance, the rankings they imply are regressed here with averages and variances calculated only over
the period 1980-89; this could arguably have an influence on the magnitude of some coefficients, but it
should not affect the general nature of the results.
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Fig. 1. CBI indices: consistency of rankings (12-country sample)
1% level of significance.26 It thus seems that previously-established results on the
strength of the CBI-inflation relationship cannot be confidently confirmed: the
26
 With 11 degrees of freedom, these rejection values are 2.201 and 3.106, respectively, see e.g. Pindyck
and Rubinfeld(1991,p.563).
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Table 5 CBI indices: comparison of rankings, 12-country sample
B
CH
CN
D
DK
FR
I
NL
NZ
SP
UK
US
Partial
GMT
GMTN
GMT9
CUK
CUKN
CUK9
AL
ES
TOR
CW
GMT
7
2
4
1
6
7
9
5
12
11
9
2
GMTN
8
1
5
1
6
8
8
4
12
8
6
1
GMT9
10
1
5
2
6
10
6
4
10
6
6
2
CUK
11
1
4
2
3
8
12
5
9
10
6
6
correlations between rankings,
GMT
1.00
GMTN
0.92
1.00
GMT9
0.75
0.91
1.00
CUK
0.75
1.00
CUKN
12
2
2
1
4
7
11
6
7
10
7
4
CUK9
9
2
4
1
2
7
9
6
9
7
9
4
AL
5
1
5
1
5
5
3
5
11
11
5
3
12-country sample
CUKN
0.71
0.94
1.00
CUK9
0.73
0.87
0.86
1.00
AL
0.82
0.78
0.62
0.52
0.47
0.54
1.00
ES
5
1
12
1
3
10
5
3
5
5
10
5
ES
0.31
0.36
0.45
0.27
0.15
0.43
0.26
1.00
TOR
6
6
3
3
1
9
11
1
9
11
3
6
TOR
0.55
0.52
0.38
0.73
0.59
0.52
0.39
0.09
1.00
CW
4
8
1
11
5
6
12
6
9
10
1
1
CW
0.23
0.20
0.00
0.21
0.20
0.01
0.09
-0 .57
0.51
1.00
Notes: AL is the Alesina (1988) 'extended and updated' version of the Bade and Parkin (1982) index of
CBI;
ES is the Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) index of policy independence;
TOR is the average turnover rate of CB Governors (1950-1989), as computed by Cukierman (1992);
CW is the index of political vulnerability of the CB (1950-1989), as computed by Cukierman and
Webb (1994).
above analysis suggests that there is a serious danger they were influenced by the
significant subjectivity of the measures used to account for CBI.
Similar observations can be made about the results on the variability of inflation.
In the ten relevant regressions, virtually all coefficients are of the expected (posi-
tive) sign, but only one t-value (with the ES ranking as the explanatory variable)
allows rejection of the null hypothesis at a 5% level of significance: the evidence on
the relationship between CBI and inflation variability is thus weaker than suggested
by previous findings, again probably because of the subjective nature of the existing
indices of CBI (and of related concepts).
The results on average growth are even more puzzling. Here the sign of nearly all
coefficients suggests that, if anything, CBI is likely to have a negative effect on
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Table 6 Regressions of respective rankings (12-country sample)
GMT
GMTN
GMT9
CUK
CUKN
CUK9
AL
ES
TOR
CW
GMT
GMTN
GMT9
CUK
CUKN
CUK9
AL
ES
TOR
CW
(A) with average inflationi, 1980-89
(measured by GDP deflator)
intercept
2.39
(1.73)
2.80
(2.00)
3.02
(1.86)
'4.53
(2.47)
»4.96
(2.79)
3.99
(2.13)
1.86
(2.07)
•4.28
(2.69)
*4.28
(2.61)
t6.12
(3.57)
indep. var.
*0.55
(2.82)
'0.53
(2.49)
0.49
(1.94)
0.20
(0.79)
0.14
(0.55)
0.32
(1.10)
fO.79
(5.15)
0.28
(1.14)
0.27
(1.09)
-0.05
(-0.21)
adj. R2
0.39
0.32
0.20
-0.03
-0.07
0.02
0.70
0.03
0.02
-0.10
(C) with average real-GDP
growth, 1980-89
intercept
T2.18
(4.90)
f2.19
(5.13)
f2.29
(4.92)
tl.67
(4.43)
tl.83
(4.74)
fl.90
(4.24)
t2.51
(6.00)
t2.07
(5.26)
tl.79
(5.03)
f2.34
(5.57)
indep. var.
0.04
(0.59)
0.04
(0.60)
0.02
(0.32)
*0.12
(2.24)
0.10
(1.73)
0.09
(1.30)
-0.02
(-0.26)
0.06
(1.04)
0.11
(2.04)
0.01
(0.22)
adj. R2
-0.06
-0.06
-0.09
0.27
0.15
0.06
-0.09
0.01
0.22
-0.09
(B) with variability of inflation,
(measured by variance of GDP
GMT
GMTN
GMT9
CUK
CUKN
CUK9
AL
ES
TOR
CW
intercept
2.21
(0.66)
3.54
(1.04)
3.29
(0.89)
6.56
(1.65)
7.04
(1.84)
2.47
(0.67)
2.95
(0.95)
1.50
(0.57)
7.60
(2.06)
tl2.18
(3.65)
indep. var.
0.94
(2.02)
0.80
(1.55)
0.85
(1.48)
0.24
(0.44)
0.17
(0.32)
0.98
(1.70)
1.03
(1.93)
*1.22
(2.95)
0.09
(0.16)
-0.66
(-1.44)
1980-89
deflator)
adj. R2
0.22
0.11
0.10
-0.08
-0.O9
0.15
0.20
0.41
-0.10
0.09
(D) with variability of real-GDP
GMT
GMTN
GMT9
CUK
CUKN
CUK9
AL
ES
TOR
CW
growth,
intercept
4.62
(1.74)
3.83
(1.52)
2.25
(0.87)
2.67
(1.03)
2.26
(0.94)
2.72
(1.00)
4.22
(1.73)
4.02
(1.67)
•5.76
(2.35)
t7.89
(3.65)
1980-89
indep. var.
0.02
(0.06)
0.16
(0.42)
0.44
(1.10)
0.32
(0.91)
0.41
(1.19)
0.35
(0.84)
0.11
(0.26)
0.14
(0.36)
-0.17
(-0.48)
-0.51
(-1.70)
adj. R2
-0 .10
-0 .08
0.02
-0 .02
0.04
-0 .03
-0 .09
-0 .09
-0 .08
0.15
Note: f-stats are given in parentheses, under respective coefficient; * (|) indicates significance at the
5% (1%) leveL
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average growth, whereas in the few earlier studies in which any trace of such an
effect was found, it carried a positive sign;27 the lack of significance of most
regressions, however (again, only one f-statistic implies significance at the 5%
level), precludes unqualified confirmation of such a link.
Finally, even using rankings rather than values to describe the status of the CBs
concerned, the variability of growth is not found to exhibit any significant relation-
ship with CBI in the 12 countries of the sample.
The results of the above computations therefore tend to confirm the impression
gathered in the previous section: as long as we are not sure that CBI is specified in a
satisfactory way, any empirical test of its influence on other variables will lack
statistical reliability (and thus credibility).28 More fundamentally, one might ques-
tion the very insistence on using such a controversial notion: since there seems to
be no objective agreement on what independence really is, how exactly it should be
measured and what precise effect it has. Why not concentrate instead on less
ambiguous concepts? Such an alternative route is advocated in the next section.
4. Beyond independence: some suggestions for an alternative
empirical approach
In the light of the statistics collected in Sections 2 and 3, it would be tempting to
claim that previous evidence in favour of CBI was misleading, and that indepen-
dence has no effect whatsoever on inflation or growth. My results, however, do not
support such clear-cut implications. All they indicate is that, given the significant
subjectivity spread affecting most (if not all) legislation-based indices of CBI, we
cannot be sure that what was regressesd against inflation or growth in earlier
studies really was independence. Consequently, we do not know whether or not
independence, if measured in an accurate way, would effectively exhibit a statisti-
cally-significant relationship with various macroeconomic variables.
One way out of such uncertainty would be to try and improve the way in which
CBI is accounted for, i.e. to devise yet another measure which, ideally, would avoid
the shortcomings of existing indices.29 But this is not the task to which this section
is devoted: the only support I can offer in this sense is the argument underlying
Section 2.4, namely that a 'relative' approach, i.e. through rankings rather than
values, probably offers less scope for subjectivity. The remainder of this section
27
 For a brief, yet dear exposit ion o f the theories underlying these diverging results, see p. 152 o f Alesina
and Summers (1993); for an elegant theoretical explanation o f possibly diverging empirical results, see
Alesina and Gatti (1995) .
28
 Another issue which arises from these tests is linked to their causality implications: discovering a
relationship between two variables is one thing, concluding that there is a one-way effect from the first to
the second variable is quite another. A discussion of Granger causality, however, would lie beyond the
scope o f this paper.
29
 Forder (1996) is a strong proponent o f the view that such an attempt is intrinsicaljy d o o m e d .
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concentrates instead on a few suggestions in favour of an alternative route, which
may yield promising results.
Independence is not a concept which academics should feel comfortable to work
with. Not only do we find it quite hard to measure it objectively, bickering over its
very components and their relative importance; we cannot even agree on a unique,
undisputed way of defining it Different authors mean different things when they
discuss independence. In the models of Debelle and Fischer (1994) or Fratianni
etal. (1993), it is equivalent, following Rogoff (1985), to the conservatism of the CB
governor (i.e. his aversion to inflation as against real-output fluctuations); for
Alesina (1988), Bade and Parkin (1982), Grilli et aL (1991), and many others, a
distinction between political and economic independence needs to be drawn;30
according to Debelle and Fischer (1994), the relevant distinction is rather between
goal and instrument independence, while Cukierman (1992) prefers to speak of
statutory and actual CBI.
Instead of trying to select from these alternative taxonomies, I suggest that we
start with the theoretical insights of Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini
(1993), who first introduced notions of contract theory into the study of the
institutional characteristics of monetary policy (on which more below). They
argue that a CB's independence is, in reality, endogenous, a mere by-product of
the incentive structure faced by the CB's governing body (Central Banker). On this
view, empirical investigations should concern themselves with the determinants of
incentives, rather than indulging in subjective estimations of the individual com-
ponents of independence.
The idea is to examine not only the statutory factors which are likely to influence
incentives (e.g., how do the CB's operational rules describe the formal tasks of the
Central Banker?), but also (and crucially) on behavioural considerations, such as:
what prevents the Central Banker from wanting to renege on his duties? Or, how
well did he achieve what he claims he undertook? Or, what consequences does he
face if his achievements do not live up to his promises?
In a sense, this shifts the focus from independence to the more tractable notion
of the Central Banker's conservatism. The perspective, however, is different from
that of Rogoff (1985), since the concept is introduced in an incentive-based rather
than in a preference-based framework.31 In Rogoff (1985) or Lohmann (1992), a
conservative Central Banker is defined as an individual with intrinsically asym-
metric preferences, while in Walsh (1995) or Persson and Tabellini (1993), his
conservatism is the endogenous result of a whole set of incentives he faces.
These incentives may include statutory characteristics, such as the constitutional
obligation to concentrate on price stability, but the ultimate, observed conservatism
of the Central Banker is determined by the enforcement mechanism which con-
strains him to fulfil his obligations.
"Although I have argued elsewhere (Mangano, 1994) that it is far from dear which criteria these
definitions should encompass, and what is their respective importance.
31
 This point is made particularly dear in Walsh (1993).
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The new theoretical literature on institutional aspects of monetary policy relies
on principal-agent theory to formalise such a dual (legal/behavioural) framework.
It shows that an optimal performance contract can be devised between the political
authorities (the principal) and the Central Banker (the agent), which not only
defines explicitly the latter's statutory objectives, but also provides him with the
incentives to achieve these objectives by making him solely responsible for the
outcome of monetary policy, and attaching well-publicised rewards or penalties
to success or failure.32 The Central Banker is thus conservative, not necessarily
because it is in his genes, not only because it is his duty to be so, but mainly
because he knows that otherwise he will be punished.
I argue that this framework promises a better basis for empirical investigations
than the usual independence-orientated framework. The following simple rules
would take into account the theoretical insights just outlined, as well as the lessons
learnt from the analysis of the previous sections. First, considering the major
subjectivity problem uncovered in Section 2, priority should be given to straight-
forward, binary choices requiring no personal judgement for their application.
Every selected variable should be allowed to take only two logical values, 'Yes' or
'No', and which of the two it takes in each instance should be unambigouous.
Second, both institutional and behavioural aspects of the CB's situation should be
included. Any element which influences the Central Banker's accountability, allows
us to evaluate his performance or reveals the extent of his commitment to his
official task should therefore be attributed as much importance as any other
which is supposed to determine his formal duties.
Thus, at the sample-selection stage, one could choose to concentrate on
institutional characteristics: the rule for inclusion might be that the attainment
of some numerical objective is explicitly imposed upon the CB (i.e. a purely
binary process: 'There exists an explicit objective', inclusion of the country;
"There exists no explicit objective', exclusion of the country). Once the sample is
defined, one could then turn to behavioural indicators to assess each Central
Banker's actual conservatism. For instance, is there a well-publicised reward/
penalty system sanctioning the performance of the CB in terms of the pre-specified
objective? And in the countries where such a system is in place, has the threat been
systematically implemented when the (measureable) objective was not achieved
(again two 'Yes/No' criteria)?
Even political influence on monetary policy-making, insofar as it also affects the
observed conservatism of the CB, may be captured in this fashion. Instructive
observations could include the following: after elections of the legislative or execu-
tive, was the CB more often kept in office, or replaced shortly after the election? Or,
32
 The contract is optimal because, in the presence of stochastic supply shocks, it allows for the pre-
determined objective to be achieved without increasing short-term output volatility. This result holds
also in an asymmetric-information framework.
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did reductions in short-term interest rates occur more often in the few months
before such elections than at other times?33
A possible objection to those proposals is that the theoretical literature on such
performance contracts, let alone the practical application of its ideas, are rather new
in the field of monetary policy-making.34 As a result, one could be confronted with
data-availability problems, both in the country-selection process and in the length
of the observation period; the alternative empirical methodology I advocate may
therefore have to wait until a larger and longer data-set is available to support it.
5. Conclusions
This study has been organised around three objectives. First, to estimate the sub-
jectivity spread of two widely-used indices of CBI; second, to assess the robustness
of established empirical results on CBI with respect to such subjectivity, and third,
to recommend an alternative orientation for future empirical investigations.
Section 2 compared the indices of legal CBI computed by Grilli et al. (1991) and
Cukierman (1992). With the help of four supplementary measures (derived from
the two original ones), it revealed that (i) on average, the authors diverged in their
assessments of about 30% of the legislation consulted to construct their indices,35
with the proportion rising to nearly 50% for some countries; (ii) they also dis-
agreed markedly on which criteria should be included in an index of legal CBI, with
only nine characteristics being common to both indices (out of a respective total of
15 and 16); and (iii) on the other hand, the fact that they used different weighting
schemes to aggregate their preferred criteria into a synthetic index probably did not
add much to their problems.
This identified subjectivity tends to undermine the findings of numerous empiri-
cal investigations, based on one or the other index, of a statistically-significant link
between CBI and average inflation. The analysis of Section 3 reinforced such
doubts. Instead of relying on the subjectivity-prone values of the indices, it focused
on the rankings produced in a 12-country sample by these (and another four)
measures; it then sought to use those rankings to explain, in turn, the average
rate of inflation, the average rate of real-output growth, and the variance of
these rates. While the sign of most coefficients in these regressions was consistent
with previous evidence (the exception being those in which average real-output
growth was the dependent variable), as many as 87.5% of the coefficients were
not statistically significant It thus appeared that former tests purporting to link an
13
 Cukierman and Webb (1994) have interesting suggestions in this respect, although they still reh/ on a
precise valuation of each criterion examined, rather than on a 'Yes/No' classification.
M
 Although the theoretical and empirical literature is fast expanding; see in particular Svensson (1995),
Lfiderman and Svensson (1995).
33
 It was not possible to determine which of the two authors was wrong in each instance, but at least one
of them was.
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ill-defined measure of independence with various macroeconomic variables were
not reliable.
On the basis of these findings and of new theoretical insights due to Walsh
(1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993), section 4 proposed a new approach to
the empirical study of monetary institutions,36 employing indicators of a CB's
operational status37 rather than direct (but biased) measures of CB independence.
By outlining major weaknesses in the prevailing empirical approach centred
around CBI, and by motivating and suggesting a different perspective, this paper
hopes to have made a constructive contribution to the ongoing debate on the
optimal structure of monetary institutions.
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